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that is important but the diligent process of identifying drivers and developing scenarios that is invaluable. To
paraphrase Helmuth von Moltke, no
forecast survives contact with reality;
good forecasters, like good planners,
excel because they have gone through
the rigorous intellectual process of examining the mental geography of a
problem and anticipating the various
contours and conditions that could arise.
Read this book only if you would like to
avoid being surprised by tomorrow’s
predictable discontinuities.
FRANK HOFFMAN

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia

Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the
New World Order. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2004. 232pp. $29.95

What role should the United States play
in contemporary international politics?
This question, or rather debate, began
at the end of the Cold War and has
never really concluded. It is a unique
debate because while everyone disagrees
on the question, all agree on its substance—the United States is the preeminent power in the world. People refer
to the United States by various names:
the lone superpower, the unipolar moment, Pax Americana, and from some
of its erstwhile allies and former enemies, the unilateral hegemon or
hyperpower. All such names try to capture the signal fact that America carries
tremendous weight in world affairs,
though for obvious reasons everyone
interprets the implications differently.
In the United States, two different
groups dominate the contemporary
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study of strategy: defense analysts and
scholars of international security. In
both fields most writers seem content
to work on very specific problems. Defense analysts tend to emphasize what
many have called the Revolution in
Military Affairs or military transformation, while many in international security still contend for a theory-driven
approach to international conflict.
However, despite the fact that strategy
bridges politics and war, defense analysts narrowly focus on the details of
defense policies to the exclusion of the
larger political issues. On the other
hand, security theorists miss even the
most basic issues pursuing theoretical
elegance and, consequently, tend to
write only for one another. Colin Gray
avoids the pitfalls of each approach in
The Sheriff.
Colin Gray is professor of international
politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior
fellow of the National Institute for
Public Policy in Virginia. He has written extensively on strategy, geostrategy,
and defense policy, and has long been
connected to the defense establishments
of the United States and NATO. Many
of his former students are working in
both places and in the academy today.
Gray begins this work by trying to understand some of the major issues facing the United States in the post-post–
Cold War era and finishes by noting it
is the little things that imperiled everyone’s ability to see the larger picture. “I
found that so much about the U.S. role
in the world is coming into contention,
that were I to devote most of my pages
to military issues, as long intended, I
would be analyzing secondary issues
while leaving matters of first-order significance insufficiently addressed.” It is
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to the issues of first-order significance
that the book is addressed.
Given the fact of America’s preeminence in the world, what should it do?
Gray sees the United States performing
the role of “sheriff” of international
politics, where others suggest running
an empire. Gray explains that “sheriff is
of course a metaphor. By its use I mean
to argue that the United States will act
on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent
or agency is competent to perform.”
That is precisely what the United States
has been doing, albeit sporadically,
since the end of the Cold War. However, during the interregnum of the
Cold War and the attacks of 9/11, the
United States was strategically adrift,
particularly during the years of the
Clinton administration, which had no
real focus except in the hope of reviving
multilateral institutions.
Three things gave rise to a renewed
strategic focus for the United States.
The first was the election of the generally experienced, conservative leadership of the Bush team; the second was
the commitment to military transformation by Bush’s Pentagon team under
Donald Rumsfeld; and third, the catalyzing attacks of 9/11, which provided
focus for their efforts. Though the administration is focused on the war on
terror now, Gray believes that U.S.
strategy should also prepare for the
eventual return of state-centric conflict.
Gray is a classical realist. A classical realist differs from the neorealist of the
academy, who emphasizes theoretical
modeling from the realpolitik practiced
by cynical German politicians of the
Bismarck era. Classical realists take
their lead from the writings of
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Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz
and calculate strategy in terms of power
and geography, or geostrategy. Through
five chapters, Gray shows why he believes the proper role for the United
States is to sheriff the international
system—that is, to regulate the international political order. He believes history shows that world order is not
self-enforcing and unless the United
States commits to regulating it, it may
not be regulated at all; or, worse, U.S.
neglect may encourage others to try
their hand at regulating international
politics, to the detriment of the current
world order.
Gray makes a strong case for the U.S.
role in regulating international politics.
The role of sheriff will help provide the
conceptual focus for military planners
and advocates of transformation. He
also suggests ways the United States can
maintain its preponderance of power,
prudent ways to serve U.S. interests as
well as keep both domestic and international politics on its side, or at least not
overtly hostile. What he does not address, however, is why the United States
should act as sheriff. What is it about
America that makes it the best candidate for the job? It cannot be simply because it is the most powerful country in
the world.
Clausewitz famously links war—and
the instruments of war, the military—
to politics. The central question for
strategy, then, should be to what end
and for what purpose should strategy
be made? To answer that question, one
must first ask what are the conditions
of internal politics that lead the United
States to want, or need, to regulate international politics. What is it about the
United States that makes it the right
power to act as sheriff? Unfortunately,
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Clausewitz himself never addressed
politics much, and neither do his successors. However, if one assumes that
the United States is the right country
for sheriff, which Gray clearly does,
then it behooves us to pay attention to
what he says.
MARK T. CLARK

Director of the National Security Studies Program
California State University, San Bernardino

Korb, Lawrence J. A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as
Presidential Speeches. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003.

Since the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union,
the United States has been in search of
a new grand strategy. Over time, the
question “What should be the post–
Cold War U.S. grand strategy?” evolved
into “What should the United States do
with its preeminence?” The answers
provided by the various erstwhile successors to George Kennan, who gave us
the Cold War’s “containment,” have
ranged from neo-isolationism—dubbed
“strategic independence” by some of its
advocates—to primacy, the consolidation and indefinite preservation of U.S.
hegemony, of what had initially been
thought to be a “unipolar moment.”
Some, most notably neoconservatives,
have even made the case for a U.S. empire—primacy on steroids.
The declaration by the United States of
a global war on terror following the attacks of 9/11 has done little to bring
closure to the grand strategy debate. Indeed, the brutally manifest new threat
and the response to it, particularly as
formulated in the Bush administration’s
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September 2002 The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,
and implemented in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, served to further fuel the debate. For many, the boldness, even arrogance, exhibited in the administration’s
security strategy, especially the explicit
embrace of “preemption” and the aftermath of the Iraq campaign, have raised
more questions than have been
answered.
It is here that Korb, with this admirably
concise and sharply focused volume,
steps up to the plate. In the tradition of
such previous Council on Foreign Relations Policy Initiatives as Reshaping
America’s Military by Korb (2002) and
Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy by
Hillen and Korb (2000), Korb here lays
out, in the form of presidential speeches,
three alternative national security
strategies.
As a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress, former director of
the National Security Studies Program
at the Council of Foreign Relations, and
former assistant secretary of defense,
Korb possesses the intellect and experience this project requires.
The author takes as his point of departure
the concerns—in some corners, furor—
generated by the Bush administration’s
2002 security strategy. Controversies
surrounding four issues are highlighted:
the embrace of preemption (and apparent abandonment of containment and
deterrence); the willingness to sacrifice
the principles of political and economic
liberalism in the global war on terrorism by recruiting the likes of Pakistan’s
President Pervez Musharraf to the
cause, for example; the inclination to go
it alone; and the evident internal tensions and contradictions, particularly
the call for maintaining and enhancing
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